日時 2010年05月11日(火) 15時50分~16時40分 場所 経済学部新棟3階第3教室 講演者 菅原 慎矢 (経済D2) 演題 Refinint the incoherency problem via compatibility: With application to entry game and binary peer effect models 概要 This paper presents a new perspective on an identification problem of a binary outcome model with mutual dependencies among observations. Previous econometric studies have characterized a statistical problem for this model called incoherency by Gourieroux et al (1981), which causes non-identification of model parameters. We refine the incoherency problem using a concept of compatibility, which has been developed in spatial statistics as a necessary condition for identification. Unlike the previous studies, our analysis shows an explicit distributional assumption which is necessary for identification. Based on this finding, we provide new insights for two empirical fields, entry game models with multiple Nash equilibria and peer effect models with binary outcomes, in which the incoherency problem has been considered as a source of the identification problem. First, it is revealed that the identification problem of entry game models has a different nature from the incoherency, and this confusion is caused by misunderstanding on the information structure of the underlying models. Second, we find that binary peer effect models must be separated to two distinct economeric problems according to the information structures.